Importantly, not all tiny house dwellers are downsizers or downshifters. In contextualizing the movement, Harris describes the use of tiny houses as temporary shelter and as a possible answer to homelessness. These dimensions of the movement receive limited attention, however, and residents from vulnerable populations such as the formerly homeless are not central among the interview participants.

In her closing, Harris conveys that the goal of this book is to inspire readers "to look for novel solutions to counter the planetary crisis we face" (p. 94). The book succeeds on this front, providing insights into how one can intentionally reimagine home and belongings and the systems in which each are embedded. This work provides a helpful complement to studies of lifestyle movements as well as works on home, consumption, and environment.

The Gay Marriage Generation: How the LGBTQ Movement Transformed American Culture, by **Peter Hart-Brinson.** New York: New York University Press, 2018. 293 pp. $30.00 paper. ISBN: 9781479826230.

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In *The Gay Marriage Generation: How the LGBTQ Movement Transformed American Culture*, Peter Hart-Brinson provides a sophisticated explanation for a significant puzzle: why did opposition to same-sex marriage collapse so dramatically in the decade or so before the Supreme Court legalized it in 2015? The answer is a stepwise journey through a history of LGBT activism and public opinion surveys about homosexuality, all in service of discussions of generation theory, attribution theory, conceptual metaphor theory, and explanations of how culture wars work. *The Gay Marriage Generation* provides a unique mixed-methods research design of survey regressions and qualitative interviews to understand how public opinion changes; it will interest researchers far beyond the specific question tackled here.

Hart-Brinson's evidence and argument are nested within discussions of generational change, expanding on Karl Mannheim. He argues that researchers should focus on finding generational triggers (p. 218), the events that cause subsections of age cohorts to change their ideas or behavior. We can thus retain the concept of generational change if we define generations not as age-defined demographic "pulses," but as subgroups of an age cohort who have responded to key events in significant ways and which subsequently become dominant through cohort replacement. "Social" generations are thus only one portion of what marketers name.

The Gay Marriage Generation identifies three periods of gay-rights activism that caused cohort differences in opinions about homosexuality: the Homophile Period (1945 to 1968); the Resistance Period (1974 to 1986); and the Gay Rights Period (1993 to 2015). These corresponded to dominant frames for homosexuality in the public sphere: illness, lifestyle, and identity, three schemata that are supported by Hart-Brinson's regression analyses. Tables of the author's six original regressions in the appendix are not always referenced directly in the text, which is a shame because they contain sophisticated analyses of public opinion change.

Statistically, Hart-Brinson finds that "cohort and period effects in public opinion cannot be explained by changing moral judgements about homosexuality or by other [demographic] factors" and that the other significant predictors are political/religious ideologies (pp. 86–87). Hierarchical age-period-cohort analysis validates Hart-Brinson's supposition that "the Identity Cohort has truly unique views of gay marriage, compared to their elders" (p. 87). Hart-Brinson also stresses two popular misconceptions: that close contact with LGBT people increases *opposition* to same-sex marriage, not support, and that the cultural schemata of homosexuality (identity versus behavior) varied independently of people's moral judgements (good, bad) about it (pp. 92, 221).

Hart-Brinson concludes that opposition to same-sex marriage collapsed for two reasons. One-third of the effect came from cohort replacement, as younger Americans of the

''identity cohort'' were much more likely to support same-sex marriage than their elders (p. 83). The more interesting two-thirds of the effect is an interaction between cohort and the interrelated independent variables of political and religious ideology.

It is this interaction that forms the backdrop to the project's qualitative research design. Hart-Brinson recruited 97 interviews in 2008 and 2009 with matched parent-student pairs from a midwestern regional public college and a community college, allowing him to explore cohort differences while controlling for parental socialization. Hart-Brinson's presentation of qualitative data is gold standard and includes all the tables and calculated percentages a reader could want, as well as detailed discussions of recruitment and coding procedures.

With his interview data, Hart-Brinson makes substantial analytic hay out of the ostensible bystanders in the culture war about same-sex marriage. It was not surprising that he found primarily young liberals in opposition to old conservatives—the ''intersection of cohort with ideology'' (p. 127). For these partisans, gay marriage was part of a culture war in which they eagerly framed their interview arguments against their absent antagonists.

Crucial were the two coherent ''middle-ground'' discourses articulated by one-third of his interviewees: a ''libertarian pragmatism'' that argued that homosexuality may be distasteful but that same-sex marriage could be fine, and an ''immoral inclusivity'' in which homosexuality is a sin no different from, say, lying, and thus same-sex marriage wasn't necessarily objectionable. While 54 percent of the young interviewees unambiguously supported gay marriage and only 9 percent were unambiguously opposed, 37 percent expressed middle-ground views that included libertarian pragmatism (6 percent) and immoral inclusivity (11 percent). For parents, only 38 percent expressed unambiguous support for gay marriage while 34 percent were opposed, but 13 percent expressed libertarian pragmatism and 16 percent some other middle ground.

Hart-Brinson's finding that attitudes about homosexuality are independent from those about gay marriage run counter to attribution theory—that our attitudes about phenomena are linked to what we believe causes them. Rather, most interviewees expressed complex, multi-causal arguments about homosexuality that refuted a false dichotomy of ''born this way'' versus ''perverted behavior,'' while others dismissed the question as beyond their knowledge. The argument here takes a detour through cognitive metaphor theory that will interest cultural sociologists and qualitative data-coders; the metaphor codes, masterfully summarized in a table, support the earlier claims of a distinct identity cohort.

Hart-Brinson also parses metaphors to show that there is a surprising consensus lurking under the pyrotechnics of the culture war: Americans of all cohorts and ideologies are impressively united about the meaning of marriage and the legitimacy of the struggle itself. Hart-Brinson found intriguing parallels between conservatives who supported civil unions because they reserved marriage for traditional couples and atheists who preferred civil unions because they wanted secular marriage for everyone (p. 164). That there is so much cross-cohort and cross-ideology support for marriage itself, Hart-Brinson claims, suggests that marriage is being reinstitutionalized after a rough patch (p. 187).

Helpfully, Hart-Brinson spends an entire chapter on the exceptional cases: old supporters of same-sex marriage and young opponents. He finds that these cases are exceptions that prove the rules of generational theory, as he defines it: resistant subcultures within ostensible generations shield today's sub-cohort of vanquished gay marriage opponents, just as they insulated iconoclastic liberals in days past—insofar as we define a generation as only that portion of an age cohort who themselves changed, and not all of those born into the time period during which the change occurred.

What I was left wondering about these discursive alternatives to straightforward opposition to gay marriage, and what all available data cannot answer, is whether the alternatives were newly available, or suddenly strengthened. Either explanation would help make sense of the ''accelerating pace of change'' that the book tantalizes us with, but abandons (p. 94).

The Gay Marriage Generation is painstakingly written, but the beginnings of chapters are engaging about the research process or Hart-Brinson's "eureka" moments. Readers benefit from next-chapter summaries that are more succinct than the previous chapter's conclusion. The book's deep involvement in so many literatures makes it difficult to imagine teaching it to undergraduates; but for graduate-level methods or cultural sociology classes, the book offers a great deal, as it does to scholars of public opinion and academics interested in generational theory.

Gringolandia: Lifestyle Migration under Late Capitalism, by **Matthew Hayes.** Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018. 280 pp. $26.00 paper. ISBN: 9781517904920.

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Gringolandia: Lifestyle Migration under Late Capitalism, by Matthew Hayes, looks in depth at a population that moves from one country to another without asking for permission. They expect to keep their culture and worldviews intact and to be respected. They live together in the same part of town. They talk to each other in their native language and are slow to learn the local language. Some start new businesses. They increase economic activity and revitalize urban areas, sometimes pushing long-time residents out.

I am talking about the many North Americans that have moved to an area of Cuenca, Ecuador, not as characterized by locals but as described by Matthew Hayes in this original book: *Gringolandia: Lifestyle Migration under Late Capitalism*. Hayes interviewed 108 American and Canadian retirees in Cuenca and a rural area also favored by retirees. He also interviewed Ecuadorians and conducted ethnographic fieldwork during visits across seven years. This book vividly describes an interesting case study and helps improve our overall understanding of human migration and how race affects immigrant reception and privileges.

These North American communities are not unique to Ecuador. For example, well over one million Americans live in Mexico today. Some estimate that, currently, more people move from the United States to Mexico than the other way around; this includes white retirees receiving social security benefits to finance their stay and many tourists overstaying their visas. Therefore, the discussions in this book are relevant for other expatriate communities.

Many interviewees in Ecuador frame their migration as an adventure, a way to stay active and gain new experiences; as an expression of individual freedom and self-expression; or as a bold move. Many of the participants in Hayes's study call themselves gringos or expats; some others call themselves "economic refugees" because they needed to move abroad to find a place with a lower cost of living. Others see themselves as "medical refugees" because they would be unable to afford healthcare in the United States, but they can access health services and other subsidies and social programs in Ecuador (p. 109). Therefore, inequality and economic and geopolitical reasons motivate their migration, which is similar for the many people moving from the global South to the global North. Nevertheless, these retirees not only benefit from a retirement income that goes further in their new location, but also from their whiteness. This arrangement is what allows them to frame precarity-led displacement as an adventure and a personal decision. Hayes finds that "North Americans think of their relocations mostly in terms of their own lives, even as they continue to be rooted in unequal global social relations" (p. 7). Problems created by neoliberal policies are met with individual neoliberal solutions that transfer the burden of some of those individuals aging into poverty in North America to the global South.

Another big difference between Latin American immigrants in the United States and U.S. emigrants in Ecuador is that the latter group can easily obtain immigration papers. One can get an Ecuadorian residency visa if one shows 800 dollars of continuous income, which can include Social Security payments. Indeed, most of Hayes's